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CIRCUIT COURTS SPLIT: VICTIM OF A DATA BREACH? 
CAN YOU “STAND” AND SUE IN FEDERAL COURT?  
Darlyn de la Rosa* 
 
ABSTRACT 
As data breaches become more frequent, those whose data has been 
stolen have begun to sue the companies that kept their personal data. In order 
to sue in federal court for this issue, the plaintiffs need to satisfy Article III 
standing. To satisfy Article III standing, plaintiffs need to show that they 
suffered an injury in fact. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts 
of Appeals have held that the risk of future identity theft arising from a data 
breach is enough to establish the injury requirement under Article III. 
Although not in a data breach case, the Eleventh Circuit has also found that 
the risk of identity theft is sufficient to establish an injury in fact. In contrast, 
the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have refused 
to find an injury in fact based on the increased risk of identity theft arising 
from a data breach. Although not in a data breach case, the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals has also found that the risk of identity theft is not sufficient for a 
plaintiff to have standing to sue in federal court. The Fifth and Tenth Circuits 
have not yet weighed in on the issue. The Supreme Court has also refused its 
opportunity to address the circuit split. The Supreme Court should address 
the issue and find that a data breach victim has suffered an injury in fact based 
on an increased risk of identity theft because (1) previous Supreme Court 
decisions regarding an injury in fact support that finding; (2) statistics and 
legislative action show a correlation between data breaches and identity theft; 
and (3) finding an injury in fact is the equitable result based on the 
pervasiveness of data breaches and the burden a data breach imposes on a 
victim, including economic and emotional burden. The Court should find an 
injury in fact for all victims of a data breach, including victims of data 
breaches that occurred during a physical laptop or box theft, and when the 
information stolen in the breach is credit or debit card information. 
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I. INTRODUCTION   
In this digital world we live in, everyone is at risk of becoming a victim 
of identity theft or some other data breach. With the rise of COVID-19,1 the 
amount of people surfing the internet has increased, further exposing those 
working from home and using their computers to obtain information about 
the virus to data breaches and identity theft.2 But the biggest question of all 
is, can we all sue?  
 
 
1 COVID-19 is a respiratory illness that can easily spread from person to person, leading people 
to practice social distancing, which includes working and attending schools remotely. See CENTERS FOR 
DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW ABOUT CORONAVIRUS DISEASE 2019 
(COVID-19), https://www.cdc.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/downloads/2019-ncov-factsheet.pdf.  
2 Preying on the public’s fear and need for information regarding COVID-19, hackers send emails 
claiming to be from legitimate organizations with information about the coronavirus with a link for 
statistical information. If the receiver opens the link, a malicious software will be installed on the 
receiver’s device and that device will allow cybercriminals to take control of the receiver’s computer, log 
their keystrokes, or access their personal information and financial data, which could lead to identity theft. 
See Steve Symanovich, Coronavirus Phishing Emails: How to Protect Against COVID-19 Scams, 
NORTON (Mar. 5, 2020), https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-online-scams-coronavirus-phishing-
scams.html. See Dan Lohrmann, How Is Covid-19 Creating Data Breaches?, GOV’T TECH. (Mar. 30, 
2020), https://www.govtech.com/blogs/lohrmann-on-cybersecurity/how-is-covid-19-creating-data-
breaches.html (“Most experts believe that public and private sector organizations will need to address 
numerous data breaches as a result of the extraordinary move to almost ubiquitous working from home 
within a few days and without much time for planning.”).  
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There are many examples of massive data breaches that have exposed 
billions of people’s records around the world. For example, in 2013 and 2014, 
a data breach on Yahoo’s database affected three billion user accounts and 
compromised the real names, email addresses, dates of birth, telephone 
numbers, and passwords of the users.3 The world’s data volume has been 
continuing to grow significantly, giving cybercriminals a greater opportunity 
to steal massive volumes of data.4 With the rise of technology, unlimited 
access to the Internet for many, and the use of digital data, millions of people 
are affected yearly by data breaches.5 As a result, data breach occurrences 
have become a growing concern for many victims, who often seek relief in 
federal court for their increased risk of identity theft as a result of the data 
breach.6 Data breach victims often sue the company that had access to the 
victim’s data for mishandling the data and allowing cybercriminals to get 
their hands on it.7  
Based on the rising nature of data breaches, federal courts have been 
asked on multiple occasions to determine whether plaintiffs who have been 
victims of data breaches can establish Article III standing based on an 
increased risk of future identity theft stemming from a data breach.8 
Specifically, these courts have been asked to determine whether the plaintiffs 
have suffered an injury in fact, sufficient to establish Article III standing in a 
federal court.9 The federal circuits are sharply divided over this issue.10 On 
one hand, the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals have 
held that the risk of identity theft is sufficient to establish an injury in fact 
because the primary reason to execute a data breach is to steal the victim’s 
identity, and therefore, a substantial risk of identity theft exists.11 The 
 
3 Dan Swinhoe, The 15 Biggest Data Breaches of the 21st Century, CSO (Jan. 8, 2021), 
https://www.csoonline.com/article/2130877/the-biggest-data-breaches-of-the-21st-century.html.  
4 Juliana De Groot, The History of Data Breaches, DATA INSIDER DIGITAL GUARDIAN’S BLOG 
(Dec. 1, 2020), https://digitalguardian.com/blog/history-data-breaches. 
5 Id.; Robert Siciliano, Identity Theft Crimes by the Numbers, BALANCE (Dec. 5, 2019), 
https://www.thebalance.com/identity-theft-crimes-by-the-numbers-4157714.  
6 Joseph F. Yenouskas & Levi W. Swank, Emerging Legal Issues in Data Breach Class Actions, 






11 See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 884 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2018); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 
(D.C. Cir. 2017); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 Fed. Appx. 384 (6th Cir. 2016); Lewert v. P.F. 
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963 (7th Cir. 2016); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 
688 (7th Cir. 2015); AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139 (9th Cir. 2010).  
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Eleventh Circuit has not specifically addressed an increased risk of identity 
theft based on a data breach but it has found that a plaintiff has suffered an 
injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft under other 
circumstances.12 In contrast, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals have found that victims of data breaches have not suffered 
an injury in fact based on an increased risk of future identity theft because 
the alleged injury is too speculative.13 Although not specifically addressing 
the risk of identity theft stemming from a data breach, the First Circuit has 
also found that an increased risk of identity theft is not sufficient to establish 
an injury in fact.14 The Fifth and Tenth Circuits have not yet weighed in on 
the issue.15 
This article will address that based on the principle that victims of a data 
breach suffer a “substantial risk” of future identity theft, these victims can 
prove an injury in fact sufficient for Article III standing because Supreme 
Court decisions, statistics, and legislative action support that finding. First, 
this article will provide definitions and background statistics on data breaches 
and identity theft. Second, this article will describe the elements of standing 
and under what circumstances the Supreme Court has found that a plaintiff 
has suffered an injury in fact. Next, this article will analyze the current circuit 
split on this issue, under what factual scenarios the circuit splits arise, how 
the courts have reached their decisions, and the reasoning behind each 
decision. Finally, this article will explain the Supreme Court’s current stance 
on the issue and why plaintiffs who have been the victims of a data breach 
have suffered an injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft. 
 
12 Christopher P. Hahn, 11 Cir. Splits from Other Circuits on Spokeo Standing, 
MAURICEWUTSCHER THE CONSUMER FIN. SERV. BLOG (May 16, 2019), 
https://consumerfsblog.com/2019/05/11th-cir-splits-from-other-circuits-on-spokeo-standing/.  
13 Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc. (In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 870 
F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 2017); Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89 (2d Cir. 2017); Beck v. 
McDonald, 848 F.3d 262 (4th Cir. 2017); Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38 (3d Cir. 2011).  
14 Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 77 (1st Cir. 2012). 
15 Allison Grande, DC Cir. Piles onto Standing Split with Data Breach Ruling, LAW360 (June 28, 
2019), https://www.law360.com/articles/1173454/dc-circ-piles-onto-standing-split-with-data-breach-
ruling.  
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II. BACKGROUND   
a. Types of Breaches and Statistics 
i. Data Breaches  
Data breaches take place when a customer’s personal information 
becomes exposed to internet predators.16 Specifically, a data breach takes 
place when cyber hackers gain unauthorized access to a corporation’s 
database.17 In these corporate databases, the cyber hackers usually find 
customer data such as passwords, credit card numbers, Social Security 
numbers, banking information, driver’s license numbers, medical records, 
and other sensitive information.18 The purpose of hacking these systems is to 
use this information for identity theft and fraud.19 Data breaches can take 
place by physically accessing a computer or network to steal local files or by 
bypassing network security remotely.20  
Data breaches have affected the companies’ databases that most 
Americans use frequently, and new breaches occur daily. For example, in 
March 2020, Princess Cruises admitted that it was the victim of a data 
breach.21 Possible data accessed included names, addresses, Social Security 
numbers, and government IDs, along with financial and health information 
of its customers.22 In addition, from 2014 to 2018, cyber thieves stole 
information from 500 million customers of Marriot International, including 
some combination of contact information, passport numbers, Starwood 
Preferred Guest numbers, travel information, credit card numbers, and credit 
card expiration dates.23 In May of 2014, a cyberattack exposed the 
information of all of eBay’s 145 million users, including the names, 
addresses, dates of birth, and encrypted passwords of all these users.24 In 
2007, TK/TJ Maxx suffered a data breach where more than 94 million records 
 
16 Steve Symanovich, What Is a Data Breach and How Do I Handle One?, LIFELOCK (July 31, 
2017), https://www.lifelock.com/learn-data-breaches-data-breaches-need-to-know.html. 




20 Id.  
21 Zack Whittaker, Princess Cruises, Hobbled by the Coronavirus, Admits Data Breach, TECH 
CRUNCH (Mar. 13, 2020), https://techcrunch.com/2020/03/13/princess-cruises-coronavirus-breach/. 
22 Id.  
23 Swinhoe, supra note 3. 
24 Id. 
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were compromised.25 In 2010, Sony PlayStation Network suffered a data 
breach where 77 million records were compromised.26 In 2013, Target’s 
server was compromised and 70 million records were stolen.27 In 2014, JP 
Morgan suffered a data breach and 56 million records were compromised.28 
Similarly, Chase’s database was compromised in 2014 and 76 million records 
were stolen.29 In July of 2019, a data breach to Capital One Financial 
Corporation exposed 100 million records.30 
In addition, statistics of data breaches show an exponential increase in 
the number of data breaches or the number of records affected reported since 
2013.31 For example, in 2013, 614 company data breaches were reported, 
resulting in 91.98 million records stolen.32 In 2014, 783 data breaches were 
reported, resulting in 85.61 million records stolen.33 In 2016, 1,093 data 
breaches took place in the United States, and that number increased to 1,579 
data breaches in 2017.34 In 2017, 197.61 million records were exposed.35 
While 1,244 data breaches took place in the United States in 2018, more than 
446.5 million records were exposed, which is the highest number of exposed 
records since 2005.36 In 2019, there were 1,437 breaches, up seventeen 
percent from 2018 but below the number of breaches in 2017.37 
ii. Identity Theft  
Identity theft takes place after a data breach when cybercriminals use 
stolen customer data to make purchases, apply for loans, withdraw money, 
 





30 Facts + Statistics: Identity Theft and Cybercrime, INS. INFO. INST., https://www.iii.org/fact-
statistic/facts-statistics-identity-theft-and-cybercrime (last visited Feb. 25, 2020) [hereinafter INSURANCE 
INFORMATION INSTITUTE].  




35 Joseph Johnson, Annual Number of Data Breaches and Exposed Records in the United States 
from 2005 to 2020, STATISTA (Mar. 3, 2021), https://www.statista.com/statistics/273550/data-breaches-
recorded-in-the-united-states-by-number-of-breaches-and-records-exposed/. 
36 Id.; Ben Luthi, What Is Identity Theft, EXPERIAN (Oct. 7, 2019), 
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/what-is-identity-theft/. 
37 INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 30.  
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or commit fraud.38 Identity theft is the fastest growing crime in America, 
impacting more than 16.7 million Americans in 2017.39 In 2018, although the 
number of identity theft victims was 14.4 million, 3.3 million people were 
responsible for some financial liability of the fraud committed against them.40 
In 2018, identity theft victims bore $1.7 billion in out-of-pocket identity theft 
costs.41  
Identity theft has severe consequences for children and adults. For 
example, in 2017, one million of the identity theft victims were children, 
causing the families more than $540 million in out of pocket expenses and a 
total of $2.6 billion in losses.42 Statistics also show that 77.3 percent of 
identity theft victims report emotional distress stemming from identity 
theft.43 Among those victims, children also experience emotional distress, 
such as stress, anger, and concern by the theft of their personal information.44 
In general, identity theft victims suffer financial stress and exhibit similar 
emotional effects as victims of violent crimes, ranging from anxiety to 
emotional volatility.45 Victims also often experience loss of confidence in 
areas where they typically had confidence, sleeplessness, isolation, self-
blame, vulnerability, difficulty eating, self-medication with alcohol or food, 
and loss of motivation.46 When it comes to family relations, identity theft can 
also cause trouble at home, with 17 percent of victims reporting suffering in 
their personal relationships as a result of the child identity fraud.47 These 
identity theft instances lead parents to believe that they should have done 
more to protect their children from identity theft, and the child victims also 
feel the same way.48 
 
38 What to Know About Identify Theft, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, 
https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/what-know-about-identity-theft (last visited Apr. 19, 2021).  
39 Bill Fay, What Is Identity Theft?, DEBT.ORG (May 22, 2020), 
https://www.debt.org/credit/identity-theft/. 
40 INSURANCE INFORMATION INSTITUTE, supra note 30.  
41 Id.  
42 Jennifer Bellemare, What Are Your Odds of Getting Your Identity Stolen?, IDENTITYFORCE 
(Oct. 28, 2020), https://www.identityforce.com/blog/identity-theft-odds-identity-theft-statistics; Stefan 
Lembo Stolba, The Emotional Toll of Child Identity Theft, EXPERIAN (Aug. 29, 2018), 
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/the-emotional-toll-of-child-identity-theft/.  
43 Bellemare, supra note 42. 
44 Stolba, supra note 42. 
45 EQUIFAX, A LASTING IMPACT: THE EMOTIONAL TOLL OF IDENTITY THEFT (Feb. 2015), 
https://www.equifax.com/assets/PSOL/15-9814_psol_emotionalToll_wp.pdf. 
46 Id.  
47 Stolba, supra note 42. 
48 Id. 
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In addition, identity theft is one of the most common consequences of 
data breaches.49 For example, in 2016, 31.7 percent of breach victims later 
experienced identity theft, compared to just 2.8 percent of individuals not 
notified of a data breach in 2016.50 Worldwide, identity theft is the most 
common type of data breach incident, accounting for 59 percent of all global 
data breach incidents in 2016.51 Regardless, whether the breach is a data 
breach or identity theft, the victims should have a right to bring an action in 
federal court. The next section addresses the requirements the victim must 
meet to bring such an action in federal court and the current stance of the 
district courts on this issue. 
III. ANALYSIS  
a. Constitutional Standing Requirements  
Under Article III of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of federal courts is 
limited to Cases and Controversies.52 In Raines, the Supreme Court 
explained that “[n]o principle is more fundamental to the judiciary’s proper 
role in our system of government than the constitutional limitation of federal 
court jurisdiction to actual cases or controversies.”53 In other words, this 
restriction is critical to the success of our separation of powers structure.54 To 
satisfy this constitutional requirement, a plaintiff must have standing to sue.55 
“[T]he question of standing is whether the litigant is entitled to have the court 
decide the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.”56 
At an irreducible constitutional minimum, standing requires the plaintiff 
to prove three elements.57 First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in 
fact,” which is an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and 
particularized, and “actual or imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or 
 
49 Bellemare, supra note 42. 
50 Matt Tatham, Identity Theft Statistics, EXPERIAN (Mar. 15, 2018), 
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/identity-theft-statistics/. 




52 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 559 (1992). 
53 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 (1997). 
54 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 341 (2006). 
55 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). 
56 Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 11 (2004).  
57 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
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‘hypothetical.’”58 The injury in fact requirement of standing “serves to ensure 
that the plaintiff has a personal stake in the litigation.”59 For example, in 
Monsanto, the Court found that a group of conventional alfalfa growers had 
suffered an injury in fact as a result of a government decision to deregulate 
genetically engineered alfalfa.60 Specifically, the conventional growers 
alleged that the deregulation would harm them because their neighbors would 
plant genetically engineered seeds, bees would obtain pollen from those 
plants, and the bees would then contaminate the farmers’ own conventional 
alfalfa with the genetically modified gene.61 The Court held that the 
conventional growers suffered an injury in fact because they would have to 
conduct testing to find out whether and to what extent their crops have been 
contaminated, and they would have to take measures to minimize the 
likelihood of potential contamination and to ensure an adequate supply of 
non-genetically-engineered alfalfa.62 The Court found that there was an 
injury in fact even when the crops were not infected with the genetically 
modified gene.63  
Second, the plaintiff must show a causal connection between the injury 
and the conduct complained of.64 To meet the causal connection element, the 
injury must be “fairly . . . traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, 
and not . . . the result [of] the independent action of some third party not 
before the court.”65 For example, in Duke Power, the Court found a causal 
connection between passing a law that limited the liability of private utilities 
in the event of nuclear accidents and provided for indemnification, and the 
environmental and aesthetic harm alleged by plaintiffs because “but for” the 
passage of the law there was a “substantial likelihood” that the nuclear power 
plants would not be constructed, and therefore the environmental and 
aesthetic harm alleged by plaintiffs would not occur.66  
Third, it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the 
injury will be “redressed by a favorable judicial decision.”67 For example, in 
Simon, the Court held that poor people who had been denied service at certain 
hospitals failed to meet the redressability element because the poor 
 
58 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016). 
59 Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 626 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
60 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 153–56 (2010). 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 154. 
63 Id. at 155.  
64 Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016).  
65 Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  
66 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Grp., 438 U.S. 59, 72–78 (1978).  
67 Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547.  
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individuals could not show that changing the challenged IRS policy 
(extended tax benefits to hospitals that did not serve indigents) would cause 
the hospitals to alter their policies and treat them.68 
i. Injury in Fact Requirement  
A plaintiff can establish an injury in fact by claiming a future injury 
when that injury is (a) “certainly impending” or (b) if there is a “substantial 
risk” that the harm will occur.69 For example, in the landmark case Lujan, 
environmental organizations dedicated to the protection of wildlife sued the 
government for new regulations that limited the geographic scope of previous 
environmental regulations.70 The previous environmental regulations 
required federal agencies to consult with the Secretary of the Interior or the 
Secretary of Commerce before undertaking actions that could jeopardize 
endangered or threatened species, which extended to actions taken in foreign 
nations.71 The purpose of the environmental regulations was to protect the 
continued existence of any endangered species or threatened species and to 
prevent the destruction or adverse modification of the habitats of such 
species.72 The organizations claimed to have standing based on some of the 
members’ testimony that they had traveled to different countries to observe 
endangered species and planned to travel to those countries again in the 
future.73 For example, one of the members of one of the environmental 
organizations claimed that she traveled to Egypt in 1986 to observe the 
traditional habitat of the endangered Nile crocodile and she intended to do so 
again.74 Another member claimed that she traveled to Sri Lanka in 1981 and 
observed the habitat of the Asian elephant and leopard, both endangered 
species, and that she intended to return to Sri Lanka in the future to observe 
the elephant and leopard since she had not been able to spot them in her 
previous trip.75 The Court rejected the organizations’ theory of standing 
because it was based on the organizations’ members’ intent to return to these 
locations someday, and it was not “imminent.” 76 
 
68 Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 46 (1976). 
69 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 168 (2014); Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 
568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013).  
70 Lujan, 504 U.S. at 558–59. 
71 Id.  
72 Id. at 558.  
73 Id. at 563–64. 
74 Id. at 563.  
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 564 n.2.  
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Similarly, in Clapper, where the Court also held that an injury was not 
imminent, attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations 
whose work allegedly requires them to engage in sensitive privileged 
communications with individuals abroad challenged a provision of the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.77 The challengers argued that 
“objectively reasonable likelihood” that their private conversations with 
foreigners would be intercepted.78 The challengers claimed that they 
communicate “with people the Government ‘believes or believed to be 
associated with terrorist organizations,’ ‘people located in geographic areas 
that are a special focus’ of the Government’s counterterrorism or diplomatic 
efforts, and activists who oppose governments that are supported by the 
United States Government.”79 The Court held that the attorneys and human 
rights, labor, legal, and media organizations had not suffered an injury in fact 
because that injury rested on a “highly attenuated chain of possibilities” and 
therefore, the injury was too speculative to satisfy the injury in fact 
requirement.80 Specifically, the U.S. persons had to rely on a series of 
possibilities, such as whether intelligence officials would seek to use the 
surveillance methods under the challenged provision or whether judges 
would authorize such surveillance.81  
Similarly, in Lyons, where the Court found that the Plaintiff had not 
suffered an injury in fact, a man was stopped by four police officers of the 
City of Los Angeles for a traffic or vehicle code violation.82 Although the 
man offered no resistance or threat, the officers seized the man and applied a 
chokehold technique, either a “bar arm control” or the “carotid-artery 
control” or both, and rendered the man unconscious and caused damage to 
his larynx.83 The man alleged that the police from the City of Los Angeles 
regularly and routinely applied these chokeholds when they are not 
threatened by the use of any deadly force.84 The Court held that in this civil 
rights action, the man lacked standing to enjoin the Los Angeles Police 
Department from using the controversial chokehold techniques on 
arrestees.85 The Court held that although the arrestee had already been 
subjected to this treatment, which rendered him unconscious, the future harm 
 
77 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 404–06, 410 (2013).  
78 Id. at 410. 
79 Id. at 406.   
80 Id. at 410.  
81 Id. at 413.  
82 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 98 (1983). 
83 Id. 
84 Id.  
85 Id. at 105–06. 
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he sought to enjoin depended on the police arresting him and choking him 
again.86 The Court found that this injury was too speculative.87 
In contrast, in Driehaus, the Court found an injury in fact where a former 
Congressman filed a complaint with the Ohio Elections Commission and 
claimed that an advocacy group violated an Ohio law that criminalizes false 
statements made during a political campaign.88 The advocacy group made a 
statement saying that the Congressman’s vote in favor of the Affordable Care 
Act was a vote in favor of taxpayer-funded abortion.89 After the Congressman 
lost the election, the Congressman dismissed the complaint, but the advocacy 
group sued in federal court challenging the Ohio law on First Amendment 
grounds.90 The Court held that the advocacy group had standing to bring a 
pre-enforcement challenge to an Ohio statute prohibiting false statements 
during election campaigns.91 The Court reasoned that the advocacy group had 
suffered an injury in fact because the group could face criminal prosecution, 
it faced a substantial risk of administrative enforcement based on the history 
of past enforcement, and because any person with knowledge of the 
purported violation could file a complaint against the group.92 The Court 
found an injury in fact even though the challenge was based on a complaint 
that had not been made regarding a statement the group had not yet uttered 
against a candidate not yet identified.93 The Federal Circuits are split in their 
decisions as to what is sufficient to establish an injury in fact. 
b. Circuit Split  
i. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of 
Appeals Find that an Increased Risk of Future Identity Theft 
is Sufficient to Establish an Injury in Fact.  
Courts in the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and DC Circuits have been adamant 
in providing data breach victims with the opportunity to seek relief for their 
heightened risk of identity theft and inconveniences that arise as a result of 
 
86 Id.  
87 Id.  
88 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 151–52 (2014). 
89 Id. at 153–54. 
90 Id. at 154–55. 
91 Id. at 161.   
92 Id. 
93 Id. at 160–65.  
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the breach. The following paragraphs provide a summary of these circuits’ 
stance and how they have arrived at their decisions.  
Precedent from the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals establishes that a 
plaintiff’s increased risk of identity theft after a data breach is sufficient to 
prove an injury in fact.94 For example, in Galaria, cyber hackers broke into 
an insurance and financial services company’s database that maintained 
records containing customers’ sensitive personal information such as names, 
dates of birth, marital statuses, genders, occupations, employers, Social 
Security numbers, and driver’s license numbers.95 The court found that the 
customers met the injury requirement because they alleged a substantial risk 
of harm for suffering future identity theft and for reasonably incurring 
mitigation costs to deal with the effects of having personal data stolen.96 The 
court reasoned that when a data breach targets personal information, a 
reasonable inference can be drawn that the hackers will use the victim’s data 
for fraudulent purposes.97 The court highlighted that although it might not be 
“literally certain” that a data breach victim’s data will be misused, there is a 
sufficiently substantial risk of harm that victims will incur mitigation costs.98 
The court further explained that where customers already know that they lost 
control of their data, it would be unreasonable to expect the customers to wait 
for actual identity theft or fraud to occur before taking steps to ensure their 
personal and financial security, and file suit against the company for its 
negligence in handling the data.99  
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals also found in several cases that 
plaintiffs who were victims of data breaches suffered an injury in fact 
necessary to establish standing based on an increased risk of identity theft.100 
For example, in Remijas, Neiman Marcus customers sued the high-end 
department store because the store suffered a data breach that potentially 
exposed the customers’ credit card information.101 The customers alleged that 
they had standing to sue based on the increased risk of future fraudulent 
charges and greater susceptibility to identity theft.102 The Seventh Circuit 
held that the customers’ increased risk of identity theft was concrete and 
 
94 Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016). 
95 Id. at 386.  
96 Id. at 388.  
97 Id.  
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
100 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 697 (7th Cir. 2015); Lewert v. P.F. 
Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 970 (7th Cir. 2016).  
101 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 690.  
102 Id. at 692.  
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particularized enough to support Article III standing.103 The court found that 
the increased risk of identity theft was not a mere allegation of possible future 
injury but the type of “certainly impending” future harm that the Supreme 
Court requires to establish standing.104 The court reasoned that the alleged 
data breach had already occurred—stealing all the customers’ personal 
data—and therefore the court did not need to speculate as to whether the 
information had been stolen or what kind of information had been stolen.105 
The court further explained that the customers should not have to wait until 
the hackers committed identity theft to give them standing because there was 
an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that such injury would occur.106  
In addition, in Remijas, the court also noted that requiring the customers 
to wait until their identity was actually stolen would make it more difficult 
for the customers to meet the “fairly traceable” element of standing.107 
Specifically, the court reasoned that “the more time that passes between a 
data breach and an instance of identity theft, the more latitude a defendant 
has to argue that the identity theft is not ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s 
data breach.”108 The court also noted that the only reason hackers would 
break into the store’s database and steal consumers’ private information is to 
sooner or later assume the customers’ identities.109  
Similarly, in Lewert, the court found the increased risk of identity theft 
was concrete where restaurant customers sued P.F. Chang’s alleging 
increased risk of identity theft based on a data breach that exposed consumer 
credit and debit card data.110 After the data breach, one of the named 
customers for this class action purchased a credit monitoring service to 
protect against identity theft, including against criminals using the stolen 
card’s data to open new credit or debit cards in his name.111 Although the 
other named customer did not spot any fraudulent charges on his card, nor 
did he cancel his card or suffer the associated inconvenience or costs, he did 
spend time and effort monitoring his card statements and his credit report to 
ensure that no fraudulent charges had been made on his card or that no 
fraudulent accounts had been opened in his name.112 The Seventh Circuit held 
 
103 Id. at 693.  
104 Id. at 692.  
105 Id. at 693.  
106 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015). 
107 Id.  
108 Id. (quoting In re Adobe Sys. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 2014 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). 
109 Id.  
110 Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 965 (7th Cir. 2016).  
111 Id. 
112 Id. 
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that the increased risk of identity theft was concrete enough to support a 
lawsuit.113 The court reasoned that a substantial risk of harm arose from the 
data breach because the primary incentive for hackers is to assume those 
consumers’ identities or to make fraudulent charges to their credit cards.114 
The court explained that even though some of the customers could have 
canceled their credit cards, they all still faced the risk of identity theft, and 
that was sufficient to establish the injury in fact element of standing.115 
Similar to the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the Ninth Circuit has also 
found that plaintiffs can meet the injury in fact element by claiming increased 
risk of identity theft stemming from a data breach.116 For example, in 
Krottner, former and current employees sued Starbucks because their names, 
addresses, and Social Security numbers were stored on a laptop that a thief 
stole from Starbucks.117 The Ninth Circuit held that the employees’ increased 
risk of future identity theft was sufficient to establish an injury in fact because 
the employees faced a “credible threat of harm,” that was both “real and 
immediate” and not “conjectural or hypothetical.”118 The court further 
explained that the employee’s allegations were more than “conjectural or 
hypothetical” because the laptop containing the customer’s unencrypted 
personal information had already been stolen.119 The court clarified that it 
would not have reached the same decision if the employees had sued when 
the laptop had not been stolen and the customers would have claimed an 
injury in fact based on the risk that the laptop would have been stolen at some 
point in the future.120 
Similarly, in In re Zappos.com, a Ninth Circuit case, the court found an 
injury in fact where customers sued online retailer Zappos after hackers 
breached Zappos’ database and allegedly stole personal identifying 
information belonging to 24 million customers, including their “names, 
account numbers, passwords, email addresses, billing and shipping 
addresses, telephone numbers, and credit and debit card information.”121 The 
customers claimed that they met the injury in fact requirement of standing 
 
113 Id. at 967.  
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 884 F.3d 893 (9th Cir. 2018); Krottner v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 
1139 (9th Cir. 2010). 
117 Krottner, 628 F.3d at 1140.   
118 Id. at 1143.  
119 Id. 
120 Id. 
121 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 884 F.3d at 894–95. 
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because the Zappos data breach put them at risk of identity theft.122 In this 
case, the customers relied on the United States Government Accountability 
Office for the definition of identity theft, which includes “various types of 
criminal activities, such as when Personal Identifying Information is used to 
commit fraud or other crimes,” including “credit card fraud, phone or utility 
fraud, bank fraud, and government fraud.”123 The court held that the 
customers had alleged an injury in fact sufficient to establish standing 
because the information stolen, which included credit card numbers, could 
be easily used to commit identity theft.124 In addition, the court noted that 
even if a long time had passed between the breach and the customers’ suit, 
the customers’ injury was imminent because “a person whose personal 
identifying information has been obtained and compromised may not see the 
full extent of identity theft or identity fraud for years.”125 
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has also held 
that the increased risk of identity theft arising from a data breach is sufficient 
to establish an injury in fact for standing purposes.126 For example, in Attias, 
the customers of a health insurance company sued the insurance company for 
a cyberattack that exposed the customer’s personal identifying information 
such as their credit card numbers and Social Security numbers.127 The court 
found that the customers met their burden of proving an injury in fact because 
the customers’ heightened risk of identity theft was substantial enough.128 
The court reasoned that the breach “exposed all of the information 
wrongdoers need” to steal a victim’s identity.129 In addition, the court 
reasoned that the hackers had already gained access to the unauthorized 
information, and it was reasonable to infer that the hackers had the intent and 
ability to use the data for “ill.”130 The court also stated that the hackers’ 
purpose in breaking into a database and stealing consumers’ private 
information is to make fraudulent charges or assume those consumers’ 
identities.131 The court explained that a substantial risk of harm existed 
simply by virtue of the hack and the nature of the data that the customers 
 
122 Id. at 894.  
123 Id. at 895.  
124 Id. 
125 Id. at 900.  
126 AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 928 F.3d 42 (D.C. Cir. 
2019); Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
127 Attias, 865 F.3d at 622, 628.  
128 Id. 
129 Id. 
130 Id. at 628.  
131 Id. at 628–29.  
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alleged was taken.132 The court noted that the customers did not need to rely 
on a series of “uncertain contingencies involving multiple independent 
actors” before the customers suffered any harm.133 
Similarly, in OPM, another D.C. Circuit case, the court found an injury 
in fact where cyber attackers breached U.S. government employee databases 
and stole government employees’ sensitive personal information, including 
birth dates, Social Security numbers, addresses, and fingerprint records.134 
The court held that the government employees established the injury in fact 
element because they faced a “substantial” risk of future identity theft.135 
First, the court reasoned that the hackers had in their possession all the 
information they needed to steal the employees’ identities, including the 
employees’ social security numbers, birth dates, and addresses.136 Second, 
the court noted that the employees’ faced a substantial risk of identity theft 
because sensitive personal information cannot be changed to avoid identity 
theft.137 For example, while existing credit card numbers can be changed to 
prevent future fraud, Social Security numbers and addresses cannot be easily 
changed for new ones, and “birth dates and fingerprints stay with us 
forever.”138 Third, the court highlighted that the employees’ risk of identity 
theft was substantial because some of the employees had already experienced 
various types of identity theft, such as the unauthorized opening of new credit 
cards and the filing of fraudulent tax returns in their names.139 Lastly, the 
court reasoned that the attackers had intentionally targeted stealing the 
employees’ private information.140   
While several federal courts such as the Sixth, Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. 
Circuits have expressly ruled on this standing issue in regard to data breaches, 
some courts like the Eleventh Circuit have however, issued opinions on risks 
of identity theft standing that would also allow victims to bring such cases in 
Federal court. 
 
132 Id.  
133 Id. at 628–29. 
134 AFGE v. OPM (In re United States OPM Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 928 F.3d 42, 49 (D.C. Cir. 
2019).  




139 Id.  
140 Id. at 58.  
18 - DE LA ROSA (DO NOT DELETE) 7/11/2021  12:37 PM 
2021] Can You “STAND” and Sue in Federal Court? 139 
 
ii. Although Not in a Data Breach Case, the Eleventh Circuit 
Has Found that the Risk of Identity Theft Is Sufficient for a 
Plaintiff to Have Standing to Sue in Federal Court.  
Although the Eleventh Circuit has not issued an opinion regarding an 
increased risk of identity theft resulting from a data breach, the Eleventh 
Circuit has found standing in an increased risk of identity theft under other 
circumstances.141 For example, in Muransky, the Eleventh Circuit found that 
a consumer had suffered an injury in fact when Godiva issued him a receipt 
that showed his credit card number’s first six and last four digits in violation 
of the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (“FACTA”).142 In that case, 
the Eleventh Circuit found an injury in fact based on the customer’s 
heightened risk of identity theft stemming from Godiva’s violation of 
FACTA.143 The court noted that the customer had established risk of real 
harm to a concrete interest sufficient to establish standing because a 
consumer undoubtedly has a concrete interest in preventing his identity from 
actually being stolen.144  
iii. Notwithstanding the Strong Reasoning Presented by the 
Other Circuits, the Second, Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit 
Courts of Appeals Have Refused to Find an Injury in Fact 
Based on an Increased Risk of Identity Theft.  
Presented with the opportunity to redress the inconveniencies of 
millions of individuals whose personal information is stolen yearly through 
data breaches as a result of companies’ mishandling their data, the Second, 
Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals have refused to find that 
these individuals have suffered an injury in fact.145 For example, the Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals has found that under certain circumstances, an 
increased risk of identity theft arising from a data breach is not sufficient to 
establish the injury in fact requirement for standing.146 For example, in 
 
141 Hahn, supra note 12.   
142 Id.  
143 Id. 
144 Id. 
145 See Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 689 F. App’x 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017); Reilly v. Ceridian 
Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2017); Alleruzzo 
v. SuperValu, Inc. (In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 870 F.3d 763, 770 (8th Cir. 
2017).  
146 Whalen, 689 F. App’x at 91.  
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Whalen, Michaels, the arts and crafts store, suffered a data breach.147 A 
customer sued Michaels after receiving two fraudulent charges on the same 
credit card she had used to shop at Michaels.148 The customer alleged that her 
credit card was physically presented for payment to a gym in Ecuador for a 
charge of $398.16.149 The credit card was also presented for payment to a 
concert ticket company in Ecuador for a value of $1,320.00.150 Among her 
theories of injuries, the customer asserted an increased risk of future identity 
theft.151 The court held that the customer did not allege a concrete and 
particularized injury because she failed to show how she could “plausibly 
face a threat of future fraud.”152 The court reasoned that the customer had 
canceled her credit card after the breach and that no other personally 
identifying information, such as name, address, PIN, social security, or date 
of birth, had been stolen in the breach.153 In this case, no charges were 
actually incurred on the card and she was not liable for any of the attempted 
charges.154 In addition, the court reasoned that the customer lacked standing 
because she failed to allege with any specificity if she had spent any time or 
money monitoring her credit.155 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals has also found that an increased risk 
of identity theft is not sufficient to establish Article III standing.156 For 
example, in Reilly, cyber hackers infiltrated a payroll processor’s network 
and “potentially gained access to personal and financial information” 
belonging to employees.157 The personal information obtained included the 
employees’ names, addresses, Social Security numbers, dates of birth, and 
bank account information.158 This case was decided before Clapper, where 
the Supreme Court elicited the “substantial risk test.”159 In Reilly, the Third 
Circuit held that the employees had not established an injury in fact based on 
an increased risk of future identity theft because the identity theft was not 
 









156 Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
157 Id. at 40.  
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 40, 42.  
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“certainly impending.”160 Specifically, the court reasoned that the 
employees’ allegations of increased risk of identity theft relied on speculation 
that the hacker: “(1) read, copied, and understood [the employees’] personal 
information; (2) intended to commit future criminal acts by misusing the 
information; and (3) was able to use such information to the detriment of the 
employees by making unauthorized transactions in the employees’ 
names.”161 The court further reasoned that in this case, the employees did not 
show evidence that the intrusion was intentional or malicious.162 The court 
focused on the fact that there had been no misuse of the information yet, 
therefore, no harm had taken place.163 The court also highlighted that no 
identifiable taking occurred because all the court knew was that a firewall 
had been penetrated.164  
The Fourth Circuit has also rejected the notion that an increased risk of 
identity theft is sufficient to establish Article III standing.165 For example, in 
Beck, a laptop containing patients’ unencrypted personal identifying 
information such as names, birth dates, the last four digits of their Social 
Security numbers, and physical descriptors was misplaced or stolen.166 
Medical record boxes that contained patients’ names, Social Security 
numbers, and medical diagnoses also went missing.167 The patients claimed 
Article III standing based on an increased risk of future identity theft.168 The 
court held that the risk of future identity theft stemming from the incidents 
was too speculative to satisfy the injury in fact requirement because the 
plaintiffs failed to allege either (i) that the thief “intentionally targeted” the 
personal information contained in the laptop and boxes; or (ii) that the thief 
subsequently used that information to commit identity theft.169   
The court in Beck distinguished its case from Krottner, Remijas, and 
Galaria, cases where the courts had found that increased risk of identity theft 
was sufficient to establish an injury in fact.170 The court explained that in 
Galaria and Remijas, “the data thief intentionally targeted the personal 
 
160 Id. at 43. 
161 Id. at 42. 
162 Id. at 44. 
163 Id. at 42, 44.  
164 Id. at 44.  
165 Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 277–78 (4th Cir. 2017).  
166 Id. at 267.  
167 Id. at 268–69.  
168 Id. at 273.  
169 Id. at 274–75.  
170 Id. at 274.  
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information compromised in the data breaches.”171 In addition, the court 
highlighted that in Remijas and Krottner, at least one of the victims of the 
data breach had already alleged “misuse or access by the thieves” to the 
personal information stolen in the breach.172 The court noted that in this case, 
the patients did not provide any evidence that the information found in the 
laptop has been accessed or misused, that they suffered identity theft, or that 
the thief stole the laptop with the intent to steal their private information.173 
The Fourth Circuit also found the risk of identity theft is not substantial 
enough to invoke standing unless the victims affected can show the risk was 
not speculative by showing an attenuated chain of possibilities.174 For 
example, in Beck, the court also reasoned that for the patients to suffer the 
harm of identity theft they claimed, the patients had to engage in the same 
“attenuated chain of possibilities” analysis the Court had rejected in 
Clapper.175 The court explained that the patients’ alleged identity theft was 
speculative because the court had to assume that (1) the thieves intended to 
steal the items to get patients’ personal information, (2) the thieves would 
then select the named patients’ personal information among all the other 
patients, and (3) the thieves would successfully use that information to steal 
the patients’ identity.176 The court further rejected the patients’ argument that 
33 percent of health-related data breaches result in identity theft because 
those statistics fall short of establishing a “substantial risk” of harm since 
over 66 percent of the patients will suffer no harm.177  
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has also held that an 
increased risk of identity theft is not sufficient to meet the injury in fact 
requirement.178 For example, in Alleruzzo, cybercriminals hacked grocery 
stores’ databases and gained access to the payment card information of 
customers, including their names, credit or debit card account numbers, 
expiration dates, card verification value (CVV) codes, and personal 
identification numbers (PINs).179 The allegedly stolen card information did 





174 Id. at 275.  
175 Id. 
176 Id. 
177 Id. at 276. 
178 Alleruzzo v. SuperValu, Inc. (In re SuperValu, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig.), 870 
F.3d 763, 772 (8th Cir. 2017).  
179 Id. at 766.  
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numbers, birth dates, or driver’s license numbers.180 The customers claimed 
a heightened chance of experiencing identity theft was their injury in fact.181 
The court held that the customers did not show an injury in fact because 
compromised credit card information could not be used to open unauthorized 
accounts, which is the type of identity theft generally considered to have a 
more harmful direct effect on consumers.182 The court relied on a report 
released by the United States Government Accountability Office from June 
2007 that explained that “credit or debit card information such as card 
numbers and expiration dates generally cannot be used alone to open 
unauthorized new accounts.”183 
In addition, in Alleruzo, the court found that the time individuals spend 
to protect themselves from identity theft after a data breach is not sufficient 
to establish an injury in fact.184 In Alleruzo, plaintiffs also argued that the 
costs they incurred to mitigate their risk of identity theft, including the time 
they spent reviewing information about the breach and monitoring their 
account information, constitute an injury in fact for purposes of standing.185 
Because the court found that plaintiffs had not alleged a substantial risk of 
future identity theft, the court also found that the time they spent protecting 
themselves against this speculative threat cannot create an injury.186 The 
court refused to find an injury in fact even though the hackers installed a 
malware on the company’s network that allowed them to “harvest” the 
plaintiffs’ credit card information, the company’s practices allowed and made 
possible the theft of plaintiffs’ card information, and that plaintiffs had 
actually already suffered theft of their card information.187  
While several federal courts, such as the Second, Third, Fourth, and 
Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals, have expressly refused to find an injury in 
fact based on an increased risk of identity theft in data breach cases, the First 
Circuit has found that the risk of identity theft is not sufficient to support 
standing in other situations.  
 
180 Id. at 770.  
181 Id. at 768–69.  
182 Id. at 770.  
183 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-737, PERSONAL INFORMATION: DATA 
BREACHES ARE FREQUENT, BUT EVIDENCE OF RESULTING IDENTITY THEFT IS LIMITED; HOWEVER, THE 
FULL EXTENT IS UNKNOWN 1, 30 (2007), http://www.gao.gov/assets/270/262899.pdf [hereinafter U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF.]. 
184 Alleruzzo, 870 F.3d at 771.  
185 Id. 
186 Id. 
187 Id. at 769.  
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iv. Although Not in a Data Breach Case, the First Circuit Court 
of Appeals Has Found that the Risk of Identity Theft Is Not 
Sufficient for a Plaintiff to Have Standing to Sue in Federal 
Court.  
Although the First Circuit has not addressed whether a plaintiff who was 
the victim of a data breach suffered an injury in fact based on an increased 
risk of identity theft, the First Circuit has faced a similar question relating to 
increased risk of identity theft.188 For example, in Katz, a customer sued a 
company for allegedly leaving her nonpublic personal information, including 
social security numbers and taxpayer-identification numbers, unprotected 
and accessible to prying eyes.189 Specifically, the customer claimed that the 
company’s users can “access and store her data at home and elsewhere, 
twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week, in unencrypted form; that 
the data, once saved by an authorized user, can potentially be accessed by 
hackers or other third parties; and that the company failed adequately to 
monitor unauthorized access to her information.”190 Among her alleged 
injuries, the customer claimed that the company’s failure to follow privacy 
regulations increased her risk of harms associated with the loss of her data, 
including identity theft.191 The court held that the customer’s theory for 
standing was insufficient because, unlike other cases where courts have 
found an injury in fact based on a similar theory, the customer’s data, in this 
case, had not actually been accessed by one or more unauthorized parties.192 
The customer’s injury was too hypothetical because she only alleged an 
increased risk that someone might access her data and that if this 
unauthorized access occurs, then it will increase her risk of identity theft.193  
Two courts remain that have not yet addressed whether a victim of a 
data breach has suffered an injury in fact sufficient to have standing to bring 
a claim in federal court. 
 
188 Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 70 (1st Cir. 2012). 
189 Id. 
190 Id. 
191 Id. at 80.  
192 Id.  
193 Id.  
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v. The Fifth and the Tenth Circuit Courts of Appeals Have Not 
Analyzed Whether a Plaintiff Who Has Been the Victim of a 
Data Breach Has Suffered an Injury in Fact Based on an 
Increased Risk of Identity Theft.   
Almost every Circuit Court of Appeals has addressed whether a plaintiff 
can establish an injury in fact based solely on the increased risk of identity 
theft as it relates to data breaches or a printed receipt disclosing a credit card 
number, in the case of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals. However, the 
Fifth and Tenth Circuits are the only appeals courts that have not yet 
addressed the issue.194  
vi. The Supreme Court Has Refused to Weigh in as to Whether 
Plaintiffs Who Sue in Federal Court and Claim an Increased 
Risk of Identity Theft Have Alleged an Injury in Fact.  
Despite the federal circuits’ divide regarding whether a plaintiff who has 
been the victim of a data breach has suffered an injury in fact from an 
increased risk of identity theft, the issue has not been addressed by the 
Supreme Court even when it has had the chance to do so.195 The Supreme 
Court denied certiorari to hear Attias v. Carefirst, a case that specifically 
addressed the issue of whether victims of data breaches have suffered an 
injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.196 In Attias, 
customers sued a health insurance company after the company suffered a 
cyberattack in which its customers’ personal information was allegedly 
stolen.197 The customers claimed to have suffered an increased risk of identity 
theft as their injury in fact .198 The Court of Appeals for the District of 
Columbia found that the customers alleged a risk of future injury substantial 
enough to meet the injury in fact requirement of Article III standing.199 In 
2018, the Supreme Court denied certiorari to hear the appeal of this case and 
failed to answer the circuit split.200  
 
194 Grande, supra note 15.  
195 See Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 1, 2017), cert. denied, No. 17-641, 
2018 WL 942459 (U.S. Feb. 20, 2018). 
196 Id.  
197 Id. at 622. 
198 Id. 
199 Id. at 626. 
200 See id. 
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c. Resolving the Circuit Split 
The Supreme Court should resolve the federal district court split and 
find that a data breach victim has suffered an injury in fact, especially in 
modern times, where employees can easily work remotely, and an 
individual’s information can get easily exposed to hackers. First, previous 
Supreme Court decisions regarding injuries in fact support finding that the 
victim of a data breach has suffered an injury in fact. Second, statistics and 
legislative action show a correlation between data breaches and identity theft. 
Third, finding an injury in fact is the equitable result based on the 
pervasiveness of data breaches and the burden a data breach imposes on a 
victim. Courts should find that a plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact, even 
in cases where the stolen information was not found in a database, and instead 
was found in a laptop or box, and even when the information found is credit 
card information, such as credit card numbers, PINs, and expiration dates.  
i. The Supreme Court’s Previous Decisions that Relate Support 
a Finding that a Plaintiff Who Has Been the Victim of a Data 
Breach Has Suffered an Injury in Fact Based on an Increased 
Risk of Identity Theft.  
The Supreme Court’s previous decisions regarding standing support 
finding that a person who has been the victim of a data breach has suffered 
an injury in fact. For example, in Clapper, the Supreme Court noted that a 
plaintiff can establish an injury in fact when he or she proves that he or she 
has a “substantial risk” of suffering the alleged harm.201 In Clapper, the Court 
only rejected the plaintiffs’ theory of standing because the plaintiffs had to 
rely on a series of speculative inferences to establish the injury.202 
Specifically, the attorneys and human rights, labor, legal, and media 
organizations had to speculate as to whether intelligence officials would seek 
to use the surveillance methods under the challenged provision or whether 
judges would authorize such surveillance.203 Similarly, in Lyons, the Court 
only rejected a former prisoner’s theory of standing because the prisoner 
challenging a chokehold technique had to assume that he would be arrested 
and choked by the police again.204 However, these Supreme Court cases 
support a finding of an injury in fact when a plaintiff has been the victim of 
 
201 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 414 n.5 (2013).  
202 Id. at 410. 
203 Id. 
204 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105 (1983). 
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a data breach and personal identifying information, such as names, dates of 
birth, Social Security numbers, driver’s license numbers, home addresses, 
telephone numbers, and fingerprint records, has been stolen, because the 
injury is not speculative. 
First, the sole purpose of data breaches is to get access to a victim’s 
credit card or personal identifying information.205 The next step following a 
data breach is to use this information in a detrimental way to the customer.206 
The most common and well-known way to use that information is by 
committing identity theft.207 As explained by the Seventh Circuit, the only 
reason hackers break into a database and steal people’s private information, 
is to sooner or later assume the customer’s identity.208 Although it might not 
be completely certain that all of the plaintiff’s stolen data will be used to steal 
the plaintiff’s identity, a court can find that there is a substantial likelihood 
that the information will be misused for identity fraud purposes.209 In these 
types of cases, the data has already been intentionally stolen, therefore the 
next step for the hackers to benefit from the theft is to use personal 
information to commit identity theft and fraud.210 Once a data breach takes 
place, the hackers have unlimited access to all the information they need to 
successfully steal a victim’s identity.211 The fact that a data breach has 
already taken place shows the hacker’s intent and ability to use the data in a 
way that harms the plaintiffs.212 In addition, this type of injury is not 
speculative because the harm, which is to steal the customer’s information 
with the intent to harm the customer, has already been done. In essence, the 
substantial risk of harm exists simply by the virtue of the hack and the nature 
of the personal identifying data stolen.213 The court does not need to engage 
in the kind of speculative inferences rejected in Clapper and Lyons to assume 
that the next natural step following a data breach is to use the data for identity 
theft and fraud.214  
In addition, Plaintiffs who claim an increased risk of identity theft 
because of a data breach face a similar situation to the facts of Driehaous, 
 
205 Martin, supra note 17.  
206 Id.  
207 Id. 
208 Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015). 
209 Connor Hays, The Ultimate Guide to Data Breaches, BLOOM (July 19, 2020), 
https://bloom.co/blog/ultimate-guide-to-data-breaches-and-identity-theft/.  
210 Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693.  
211 Attias v. CareFirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017). 
212 Id. 
213 Id. at 629.  
214 Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013); City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 
U.S. 95, 105 (1983). 
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where the Court found the injury was not speculative.215 In Driehaous, the 
Supreme Court found that an advocacy group had suffered an injury in fact 
because the group faced a substantial risk of administrative enforcement of 
the challenged statute based on the history of past enforcement and because 
any person with knowledge of the violation of the statute could file a 
complaint against the advocacy group.216 The Supreme Court found standing 
even when the advocacy group sued based on a political statement that the 
group had not yet made against a political candidate not yet identified.217 The 
Court found in favor of the advocacy group even when the challenged statute 
had not yet been enforced against the group nor someone who would file the 
complaint against the group had been identified.218 In that case, the Court did 
not find the kind of speculative, highly attenuated chain of possibilities it had 
previously rejected in Clapper and Lyons, and instead found that the 
advocacy group had suffered an injury in fact based on the substantial risk of 
statutory enforcement against them.  
Plaintiffs who have suffered a breach of their personal data have an even 
stronger case for standing to sue than the advocacy group in Driehaous.219 
Similar to the advocacy group in Driehaous, the plaintiffs whose personal 
data has been stolen face a substantial risk of identity theft based on the nature 
of the personal identifying data stolen, the purpose of data breaches, and the 
statistics that show a strong correlation between data breaches and identity 
theft, especially the correlation between data breaches that have 
compromised personal identifying information and identity theft.220 The 
plaintiffs’ sensitive information has already been stolen. The next natural step 
is for the hackers to actually use the information to the victim’s disadvantage. 
It is not speculative or hypothetical to assume that the information will be 
used for identity theft because that is precisely the purpose of a data breach. 
Similar to the holding in Driehaous, courts do not have to rely on a series of 
highly attenuated chain of possibilities to conclude that victims of a data 
breach suffer a “substantial risk” of becoming victims of identity theft.221  
 
215 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 149–50, 161 (2014). 
216 Id. 
217 Id. at 160–65.  
218 Id. at 161.  
219 Id. at 149–50, 161.  
220 Martin, supra note 17; Brandon Bailey, Pain of Identity Theft on Victim Is Palpable, DET. FREE 
PRESS (Dec. 22, 2014, 12:03 AM), https://www.freep.com/story/money/personal-
finance/2014/12/22/identity-theft-victims-personal-information/20612747/ [hereinafter DFP]; Tatham, 
supra note 50. 
221 Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 149–50, 161 (2014). 
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Therefore, previous Supreme Court decisions support a finding that 
plaintiffs who have been the victims of a data breach have suffered an injury 
in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.  
ii. The Statistical Correlation Between Data Breaches and 
Identity Theft and Legislative Action Supports a Finding that 
a Plaintiff Who Has Been the Victim of a Data Breach Has 
Suffered an Injury in Fact Based on an Increased Risk of 
Identity Theft.  
Identity theft is strongly correlated to data breaches. Analysts estimated 
that in 2014, one in three Americans affected by a data breach ultimately 
became the victim of financial fraud or identity theft.222 These statistics show 
a significant increase in the correlation between data breaches and financial 
fraud or identity theft from 2010, where it was estimated that one in nine 
Americans who suffered a data breach then became the victim of identity 
theft or financial fraud.223 In addition, in 2016, 31.7% of data breach victims 
later became the victims of identity theft, compared to a very low 2.8% of 
individuals whose information was not involved in a data breach in 2016 and 
still became the victims of identity theft.224 In 2018, the number of personal 
records exposed increased up to 446,515,334 from 197,612,748 in 2017, 
which analysts correlated to an expected increase in the number of identity 
theft victims in 2018.225 
Even state legislative actions support the idea that identity theft is highly 
correlated to data breaches. Specifically, state legislatures have shown that 
once a person has become the victim of a data breach, the victim has to take 
certain steps to protect itself from identity theft and fraud.226 Legislatures 
have recognized that action needs to be taken after a data breach because of 
the high correlation between data breaches and identity theft.227 For example, 
due to the frequency and severity of data breaches, all fifty state legislatures 
have passed security breach notification laws.228 These laws provide citizens 
 
222 DFP, supra note 220.  
223 Id.  
224 Tatham, supra note 50. 
225 Ana Bera, 50 Shocking Identity Theft Statistics, SAFEATLAST BLOG (Mar. 6, 2019), 
https://safeatlast.co/blog/identity-theft-statistics/#gref.  
226 Security Breach Notification Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES (July 17, 2020), 
https://www.ncsl.org/research/telecommunications-and-information-technology/security-breach-
notification-laws.aspx.  
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with the right to be notified in a timely manner once their records have been 
exposed in a data breach.229 Therefore, statistics and legislative action support 
a finding that victims of a data breach have suffered an injury in fact based 
on an increased risk of identity theft. 
iii. Courts Should Find that Plaintiffs Who Have Been the 
Victims of a Data Breach Have Suffered an Injury in Fact 
Based on an Increased Risk of Identity Theft Because That Is 
an Equitable Result Based on the Pervasiveness of Data 
Breaches and the Burden a Data Breach Imposes on a Victim. 
Allowing plaintiffs who have been the victims of a data breach to sue in 
federal court based on an increased risk of identity theft is also an equitable 
result. Although the purpose of standing is to limit the judiciary power, the 
purpose of having a judiciary branch is to provide injured parties with 
redressability and a remedy in court. That is why the Founding Fathers 
included Article III, Section 1 in our Constitution, creating a judiciary.230 In 
this case, it is equitable to allow victims of data breaches to sue in federal 
court because data breaches become more common every year and victims 
suffer severe consequences from those data breaches.  
1. Pervasiveness of Data Breaches  
First, an ever-increasing number of Americans are affected by data 
breaches yearly. Since 2011, the number of data breaches reported in the 
United States has been rising.231 For example, in 2013, 614 data breaches 
were reported.232 In 2014, that number rose to 783 data breaches.233 The 
number of data breaches in 2016 increased to 1,093, further increasing to 
1,579 data breaches reported in 2017.234 These numbers suggest that data 
breaches have become more common in recent years, exposing a greater 
number of individuals to an increased risk of identity theft and to the costs 
associated with dealing with the consequences of the breach. These numbers 
also suggest that the number of people who hope for a day in court against 
the companies that negligently handled their personal data has increased.  
 
229 Id. 
230 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.  
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The United States is also the country with the highest ratio of data 
records stolen relative to its population.235 For example, the United States 
leads data breach records with 6 billion records stolen and with a ratio of 19 
in comparison to its population.236 South Korea followed the United States 
with 229 million and with a 4.5 ratio.237 Next, were Canada and the United 
Kingdom with 91 and 140 million records stolen compared to 2.5 and 2.1 
ratios respectively.238 Last, was Australia with 50 million records stolen and 
with a ratio of 2.239   
In addition, data breaches are so pervasive that data stolen in the United 
States can be used anywhere in the world. For example, in Whalen, a 
customer’s data was stolen in the United States from a purchase she made at 
Michaels, and her credit card information was presented to make purchases 
in Ecuador. Because data breaches affect Americans so pervasively and data 
breaches are strongly correlated to identity theft, victims of data breaches 
should be found to have suffered an injury in fact to be able to sue in federal 
court and seek redress for their inconveniences.  
2. Mitigation Economic Costs of a Data Breach  
Data breaches are also costly and burdensome to the victims.240 As 
explained by the Sixth Circuit, data breach victims often have to take steps 
to protect their personal and financial security following a data breach.241 In 
many instances, it may be very difficult and even impossible for the victims 
to change the information stolen in the breach, such as Social Security 
numbers, home addresses, or birth dates. In addition, for personal identifying 
data, victims might have to hire an expert or purchase a software to remove 
the data from the web, specifically from the “dark web” where cyber hackers 
are common.242 If the victim does not take these steps, the victim may be at 
risk of being “victimized repeatedly over time as the data is reused and 
resold.”243 Therefore, becoming the victim of a data breach can be unsettling 
 






240 See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016). 
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242 See Wendy M. Grossman, The Impact of a Breach: When the Fallout Means More than Money, 
INFO SECURITY MAG. (Aug. 21, 2017), https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/magazine-
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and costly. In addition to the costs of data breaches, data breach victims 
should be allowed to sue in federal courts based on an increased risk of 
identity theft because data breach victims “may not see the full extent of 
identity theft or identity fraud” for many years to come.244 Because of the 
economic costs associated with a data breach to prevent severe consequences 
such as identity theft, courts should find that a data breach victim has suffered 
an injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft. 
3. Emotional Costs of a Data Breach  
In addition, data breaches have lasting emotional effects on the victims, 
instilling fear, anxiety, and even danger.245 Following a data breach notice, 
individuals often experience fear and anxiety that the data breach will lead to 
identity theft, and anger that the breached entity was so careless with their 
personal information.246 For example, data breaches of medical records 
provoke extensive anxiety.247 Victims of medical records data breaches are 
concerned with issues such as whether medical identity theft will cause them 
to be refused medical care.248 Because of the lasting emotional effects, a data 
breach victim can suffer, courts should find that a victim of a data breach has 
suffered an injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft.  
iv. Unlike the Fourth Circuit’s Finding in Beck, the Victim of a 
Data Breach from a Stolen Laptop Is Sufficient to Find that 
the Victim Has Suffered an Injury in Fact Based on an 
Increased Risk of Identity Theft.  
The theory that an increased risk of identity theft resulting from a data 
breach is sufficient to establish an injury stands even when the item stolen 
was a laptop with unencrypted personal identifying data. In contrast, in Beck, 
the Fourth Circuit found that patients did not have standing to sue based on 
an increased risk of identity theft when a laptop and medical record boxes 
containing the patients’ personal identifying information were stolen.249 The 
court mainly reasoned that the patients failed to prove that the thief had 
intentionally targeted the personal information contained in the laptop or 
 
244 In re Zappos.com, Inc., 884 F.3d 893, 898–99 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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boxes or that the thief had subsequently used the information to commit 
identity theft.250 Nonetheless, the only reason why a thief would target boxes 
that contain personally identifying information is to use that information in 
some way to their advantage. Empty boxes without the personally identifying 
information have no value to a thief; therefore, the only plausible reason why 
those boxes were taken was for the same reason that thieves penetrate 
encrypted databases. The same reasoning applies to the stolen laptop. The 
actual device has little value without the personally identifying information 
that can be used to later steal the patients’ identity and commit fraud. Also, 
in Beck, the fact that the only items stolen were a laptop and a box containing 
patients’ personally identifying information speaks as to the intent of the 
thieves. Similar to a breach in an online database, the information necessary 
to commit identity theft has already been stolen, and the next natural step of 
the theft is for the thief is to use that information in a way that benefits them 
and harms the victims. Specifically, the next step is for the thief to commit 
identity theft or fraud. 
v. Unlike the Eighth Circuit’s Decision in Alleruzzo, Stolen 
Credit Card Information Such as Credit Card Number, PIN, 
and Expiration Date Can Give Rise to an Injury in Fact Based 
on an Increased Risk of Identity Theft.  
An increased risk of identity theft based on credit card data theft is 
sufficient to find that a data breach victim has suffered an injury in fact. In 
Alleruzzo, cybercriminals hacked grocery stores’ databases and gained access 
to the payment card information of customers, including their names, credit 
or debit card account numbers, expiration dates, card verification value 
(CVV) codes, and personal identification numbers (PINs).251 The court held 
that the victims had not suffered an injury in fact based on an increased risk 
of identity theft because credit card information could not be used to open 
unauthorized accounts.252 Although credit or debit card information may not 
be used alone to open new unauthorized accounts, the victims of a data breach 
of this kind have still suffered an injury in fact.253 Specifically, plaintiffs’ who 
have been victims of a data breach giving hackers access to the plaintiffs’ 
credit card information have suffered an injury in fact because they must 
spend time and effort monitoring their credit card transactions or canceling 
 
250 Id. at 274–75.  
251 In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 766 (8th Cir. 2017).  
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those credit cards. The information stolen could also be sold on the black 
market by the hackers. In addition, the plaintiffs have to deal with the mental 
anguish that their information was stolen and the insecurity that they do not 
know what the hacker might do with their information. Therefore, even if the 
information stolen is not personally identifying information, a data breach of 
credit or debit card information is sufficient to find that a plaintiff has 
suffered an injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should weigh in on the issue and find that a Plaintiff 
who has been the victim of identity theft has suffered an injury in fact 
sufficient to grant standing to sue in federal court, agreeing with the Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and D.C. Circuit Courts of Appeals. First, previous Supreme 
Court decisions regarding an injury in fact support that finding. Second, 
statistics and legislative action show a correlation between data breaches and 
identity theft. Third, finding that a Plaintiff who has been the victim of a data 
breach has suffered an injury in fact is the equitable result based on the 
pervasiveness of data breaches and the burden a data breach imposes on a 
victim, including economic and emotional burden. Courts should also find an 
injury in fact based on an increased risk of identity theft applies to all victims 
of a data breach, including data breaches that occurred during a physical 
laptop or box theft and when the information stolen in the breach is credit or 
debit card information.  
As the use of technology becomes more pervasive, and data breaches 
and identity thefts become more common, the Supreme Court should settle 
the issue once and for all and allow victims of a data breach to solve their 
grievances in federal court. Under our constitution, data breach victims are 
owed the chance to be heard in court, and the companies that negligently 
handled their data deserve to be held accountable for their mistakes. 
 
